DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
LEGISLATION-NORTH CAROLINA STYLE
I. Introduction
A. ThePresentPositionof the United StatesSupreme Court
Since the presentation of and struggle over the Roosevelt
"court plan" in 1938, -therehas been a decided shift in the
application by the United States Supreme Court of the "due
process" clauses of the United States Constitution to state
and Federal legislation in economic and public welfare
fields. During the period prior to 1938 the United States
Supreme Court had often used the "due process" sections of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution to invalidate economic legislation on the ground
that the particular legislation under attack, in its substance
and not merely its procedures, denied "due process of law".1
With the advent of the "court plan"-possibly because of
it-there was a decided shift in emphasis by the Court in
economic matters, the Court refusing to look into the substance of economic legislation, with the result that from
1938 up until the present the United States Supreme Court
has failed to upset the considered judgment of either a state
legislature or the Congress of the United States in legislation pertaining to economic matters on grounds of failure
of such legislation to comply with the "due process" requirements of the United States Constitution.
B. The Importance of State Court Interpretationsof Due
Process Clauses in State Constitutions.
The deference of the United States Supreme Court to the
legislatures in the fields of economics and public welfare,
however, has not given state legislatures a completely free
rein in passing economic legislation. The supreme courts
of the several states, while bound by Federal decision in
1 Mcune, The Nine Young Men, Ch. III (1947). For pre-1938 decisions see, e.g., Tyson & Bros. v. Benton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1931); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917). For
post-1938 cases see, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Daniel
v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
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Federal matters, have the final word in interpreting clauses
of their own state constitutions. A state constitution may
contain clauses identical to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, but the
state supreme court may interpret the clauses of its state
constitution without fear of having such interpretation overruled by another court in a way directly opposite to the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments. Thus it is in: the power of
the state courts to invalidate state legislation as violative
of some "due process" clause of the state constitutions when
the same legislation is perfectly valid from the standpoint
of Federal constitutional law. State legislatures may find
that their attempts at economic legislation, while not under
attack in the Federal courts on substantive "due process"
grounds since 1938, are being struck down by state supreme
courts as being violative, in substance and not just procedures, of some state constitutional "due process" provision. A recent article 2 makes an excellent general survey
of state court decisions in recent years in the field of substantive "due process". It is the purpose of the present
article to examine the decisions of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in this field in an effort to give a more particularized example of the course of decisions in a fairly
typical state court.
C. Due Process Provisions of the North Carolina Constitution.
"Due process of law" is at most a nebulous concept, difficult to apply and almost impossible to define. The North
Carolina Constitution contains no specific requirement that
anything be according to "due process of law", but the North
Carolina Supreme Court has examined the State Constitution and interpreted'several of its provisions as guarantees
of "due process". The provision most often so construed
is Article I, section 17, which provides:
2 Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process In The States,
34 Minnesota Law Review 92 (1950).
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"No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges or outlawed or exiled or in any manner deprived of his life,
liberty or property but by the law of the land",
Other provisions interpreted as calling for "due process"
are Article 1, section I, 4 asserting the equality and rights
of man, Article 1, section 29, 5 calling for a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and Article 1, section 31,6
decrying perpetuities and monopolies as contrary to the
genius of a free state. While interpreting the several provisions of the State Constitution as guaranteeing "due
process", the Court has failed to give, as have virtually all
courts, any single definition or decision determining the
exact requirements which legislation must meet to satisfy
"due process". It seems the only way of making any fair
examination of the extent to which the North Carolina
Court has followed the United States Supreme Court in
recognizing the validity of the legislative judgment in economic matters is to examine the facts and holdings in the
particular cases since 1938 in which the North Carolina
Court has construed the "due process" clauses of the State
Constitution. For the purposes of examination, the cases
have been divided into two groups: first, the cases involving
licensing boards and commissions, and second, all other
cases involving economic legislation, the latter grouping
including such varied mattes as stream pollution legislation, "Fair Trade" legislation, and labor legislation.
' "The qaw of the land' Is equivalent to 'due process of law'."
State
v. Collins, 169 N. C. 323, 84 S. E. 1049 (1915).
4 N. 7. Constitution, Art. I, §1: "That we hold it to be self evident
that all persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their
creator with certain inalienable rights; that among those are life,
liberty and the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the
pursuit of happiness."
' X. C. Constitution, Art. 1, § 29: "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of
liberty."
0 X. C. Constitution,Art. 1, § 31: "Perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not to be allowed."
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H. Examination of Cases

A. Licensing;boardsand Commissions.
Over the years the North Carolina General Assembly
has passed legislation providing for the regulation and
licensing of at least 22 professions and occupations under
supervision of boards composed of members Qf the particular professions or occupations regulated. 7 The statutes
setting up the various licensing boards have, from time to
time, come under attack in the North Carolina Suprpme
Court, and it was in a case attacking one of the many licensing board statutes that the North Carolina Court was presented its first opportunity after the !'court plan" of passing
on the validity of state economic legislation under the "due
process" provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. In
1935 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the
Photography Act8 providing for the establishment of a State
Board of Photographic Examiners to be appointed by the
Governor, and providing that all commercial photographers
with a few exceptions such as newspaper photographers,
must be licensed by the Board to practice photography. All
photographers who had not. practiced their trade for more
than a year prior to the passage of the act were required to
take an examination prepared by the Board before obtaining a license, the Board giving licenses to those who qualified as to competency, ability and integrity. The Act was
to apply only in cities of a population of 2500 or more. In
1938 one Lawrence was indicted for violating the provisions
of the Act, anda jury having found that the defendant had
engaged in commercial photography in a town of more than
2500 people without having been licensed by the Photography Board, the trial judge ruled that the defendant was
guilty of no crime on grounds of the invalidity of the
statute. The State appealed under a provision of the North
Carolina Code 9 providing for appeal by the State from a
special verdict in a criminal case, whereupon the Supreme
State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
N.C.G.S. 91-8.
'N.C.G.S. 15-179.
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Court reversed 0 and upheld the Photography Act in an
opinion by Justice Clarkson. The majority opinion pointed
out that there was a public interest in fire protection, protection against fake pictures, protection against misuse of
pictures in trials, causing photography to be a matter for
regulation for the protection of the public interest under
the "police power" and said:
"The matter is largely in the discretion of the General Assembly as to what professions and occupations
are within the police power of the state and subject to
regulation . . . It is equally well settled that no act of
the General Assembly ought to be declared violative of
any constitutional provision unless the conflict is so
clear that no reasonable doubt can arise . . . Taking
the act and considering it as a whole, we cannot say that
it is arbitrary or unreasonable or an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. We think the conclusion in the brief of the State is correct: 'It is submitted that the Legislature of the State of North Carolina is the proper division .of the State's government to
determine in the first instance the need of regulating
a given occupation."
Thus, in the same year as the "court plan", the North Carolina Court seemed to be following the United States Supreme Court in its reasoning as well as in its holdings in
a case involving the constitutionality of economic legislation
challenged as violative of state constitutional "due process"
provisions.
The year 1940, however , saw a reversal by the Court of
its position in the licensing board field and a limitation of
some of the broad language of the Court in State v. Lawrence. Chapter 30 of the 1937 Public Laws of North Carolina had provided for the establishment of a State Dry
Cleaners Licensing Commission, and the Court ruled" the
statute unconstitutional as discriminatory in exempting 14
counties, as failing to set proper standards for licensing
by the Board and, important for the purposes of this paper,
as violative of Article 1, section 31 and Article 1, section
10State v. Lawrence, note 7. The statute was attacked under Article
1-1, 1-17, 1-29, and 1-31.
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940).
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29 of the State Constitution. The Court said that dry
cleaning was one of the ordinary occupations not so affected
with a public interest as to make it subject to exclusionary
licensing provisions under the guise of the exercise of the
police power. Referring to a legislative statement of
reasons for the necessity of the statute, the Court said :12
"The Legislature cannot by preamble or fact finding
declaration attribute to a business or occupation a
characteristic which it does not have according to common knowledge and experience and thus withdraw the
legislation from judicial review."
The Court expressed the view on "common knowledge" that
dry cleaning involved no special danger to public health
or welfare. In interpreting Article 1, section 29,13 the Court
said that the frequent recourse to fundamental principles
required by that section of the Constitution was intended
to give the individual greater freedom than he would otherwise have and thus restrain the police power, the idea of
the Court seemingly being that the licensing involved in the
case was something in the nature of a deprivation of civil
rights. Justice Clarkson, concurring on other grounds,
restated 14 the view expressed by the Court in upholding the
Photography Act and seemingly reproached the majority
for its position as to review of the legislative judgment on
the necessity of regulation of the dry cleaning business.
Although the invalidity of the Dry Cleaners Act as denying
"due process" was an alternative holding rather than the
sole ground for the decision of the Court, the language used
by the Court seems to indicate a shift by the Court from its
position of almost complete deference to the Legislature in
economic legislation as stated in the Lawrence case, to a
position where the Court will look into the substance of
such legislation, at least in the field of licensing.
Supra, note 12, at p. 760.
See note 5.
Supra, note 11, Clarkson concurring: "If the dry cleaning business, considering the proportions to which it has grown in the life
today, is affected with a public Interest, the courts may not deny the
power of the Legislature to impose regulations upon it. The decision
as to what is affected with a public interest Is primarily for the Legis12

3

2'

lature, though always open to judicial inquiry."
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The next major case involving the constitutionality of a
licensing board, 15 and the most recent case in which the
North Carolina Court has passed upon the constitutionality,
under the "due process" clauses, of economic legislation,
6
was the 1948 case of State v. Ballance.1
The facts in the
Ballance case were virtually identical to those in the original
1938 case upholding the Photographer's Act :17 an unlicensed
photographer was charged with violation of the Photographer's Act and convicted on the strength of the 1938 case.
On appeal the Court held the statute invalid as violating
Article 1, sections 1,.17, 29 and 31 of the State Constitution.
The opinion of the Court, by Justice Ervin, seems to state
the present position of the Court on the Photographer's Act
and also seems to indicate the extent to which the Court
will go in substituting its own views as to the reasonableness or necessity for the substance of licensing statutes for
the judgment of the Legislature:
"When all is said, photography is one of the many
usual legitimate and innocuous vocations by which men
earn their daily bread. It is, in essence, a private business unaffected in a legal sense with any public interest . . .When Chapter 92 of the General Statutes is
laid alongside the revelant legal authorities and principles, it is plain that it is not a valid exercise of the police
power of the state, and that it violates the constitutional
guaranties securing to all men the rights to "liberty, the
enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness" and providing that no person is to be
deprived of "liberty or property but by the law of the
land." It unreasonably obstructs the common right of
all men to choose and follow one of the ordinary lawful
and harmless occupations of life as a means of livelihood,' 8 and bears no rational, real or substantial rela" Motley v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 228 N. C. 337, 45 S.E.
2d 250 (1947).
16 State v. Ballance, 229 N. C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
For other
cases invalidating similar statutes in the same field see Buehman v.
Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P. 2d 227 (1941); Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla.
496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945); Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E. 2d 647
(1939); Territory v. Kraft, 33 Haw. 397; State v. Cromwell, 72 N. D.
565, 9 N. W. 2d 914 (1943); Wright v. Wiles, 173 Tenn. 334, 117 S.W.
2d 736 (1938); Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S.E. 2d 348 (1946).
17 Supra, note 10.
18 Italics added.
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tion to the public health, morals, order or safety, or
the general welfare. Instead, it is addressed to the
interests of a particular class rather than the good of
society as a whole, and tends to promote a monopoly in
what is essentially a private business."
The Ballance Case indicates that in the field of licensing
boards the North Carolina Supreme Court will not hesitate
to invalidate the judgment of the General Assembly as to
the reasonableness or necessity of the legislation and that
the Court will set aside such legislation because it substantively violates "due process" of law.
B. Other Economic Legislation.
Turning from the field of licensing boards and commissions to other economic fields, we find a much greater obeisance of the Court to the considered judgment of the legislature. In the year following the Supreme Court's approval
of the Photography Act in State v. Lawrence, economic legislation in another field was brought under attack in the State
Court on the ground of violation of "due process" provisions
of the State Constitution. The North Carolina General
Assembly passed a "Fair Trade Act", setting minimum
prices for certain "brand" products, and the Lilly Co., a
drug wholesaler, sought to enforce the provisions of the
act against a retail firm selling "brand" products below
the "fair trade" price. The Supreme Court upheld 9 the
act as neither violative of Article 1, section 17 nor Article
1, section 31 of the North Carolina Constitution and said in
part: "We have nothing to do with the expediency of an
economic experiment . . .", pointing out that such was
within the legislative power of the General Assembly. The
views expressed by the Court were very similar to the
views presently expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in regard to economic matters. After the upholding
of the "Fair Trade" Act, the Court upheld as "reasonable"
legislation not violative of "due process" clauses of the
State Constitution, a statute applying unemployment compensation laws to a person owning three places of business
19Lilly Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939); cf. 63
Harv. L. Rev. 546 (1950) (discussing fair trade).
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employing more than eight persons in the agrgegate,20 and
statute relieving an employer from liability for assignment
of wages of employees unless the assignment was accepted
in writing by the employer, 21 but the words of the opinions
shed no light on whether the Court found the substance of
the legislation not violative of the "due process" clauses of
the Constitution or whether the Court was leaving the substance of the legislation up to the General Assembly.
As did fifteen other states at about the same time, the
North Carolina General Assembly passed in 1947 a so-called
"Right to Work" act, 22 forbidding employer-union contracts
providing for closed shop conditions and check-off of union
dues. Whitaker, an employer, and DeBruhl, an officer and
agent of a union, were indicted for entering into a closed
shop agreement and were convicted and fined fifty dollars
($50.00) apiece. Upon appeal the State Supreme Court
23
upheld the conviction and the Act; the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Seawell, one of the dissenting justices in
the 1938 upholding of the Photographer's Act, made statements indicating that the position of the North Carolina
Court and the United States Supreme Court in general economic matters is the same today :24
"We are not called upon here to determine the wisdom of the Legislature's action in adopting Ch. 328.
Our sole concern must be whether the Legislature has
acted within the limitations imposed upon it by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and Article 1, section 17 of the State Constitution. In
determining that question we believe that Article .1,
section 17, should be viewed in the same light as Justice
Holmes regarded the Fourteenth Amendment: 'There
is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of
its words to prevent the making social experiments
2 State v. Willis Barber and Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709, 151 S. E.
2d 4 (1941).
Morris v. Holshouser, 220 N. C. 293, 17 S. E. 2d 115 (1941).
12Ch. 328, Session Laws of N. C. 1947, as supplementing N.C.G.S.
Ch. 75.
• State v. Whitaker, 228 N. C. 352, 45 S.E. 2d 860 (1947). Affd. 335
U. S.525 (1949). At p. 358 the N. C. Court points out that 15 states have
adopted similar closed shop statutes.
21Supra, note 23 at page 370.
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that an -important part of the community desires in the
insulated chambers afforded by the several States,
even though the experiments may seem futile or even
noxious to me and those whose judgment I respect.'"
The Court also quoted from and cited a number of opinions
of the United States Court handed down since 1938 and
covering economic legislation. Outside the licensing field,
the opinion is the latest one of the Court involving the
validity of economic legislation under the "due process"
clauses of the State Constitution, and it seems to indicate
that the Court will now give great deference to the Legislature in economic matters. Since 1938, the only economic
legislation outside the licensing field, which has been invalidated on grounds of lack of "due process" was a proviso 23 of the General Statutes exempting corporations chartered prior to March 4, 1915, from a proscription against
emptying substances inimical to fish into streams within the
State, the Court saying only that the distinction between
corporations chartered before and after the prescribed
date had no relation to the evil sought to be remedied and
that the provisions of the statute invalidated violated Article 1, section 17 of the State Constitution.
I.

Conclusion

In the most recent case in which the North Carolina
Supreme Court has considered" the validity of economic
legislation in relation to the "due process" clauses of the
State Constitution, the Court inquired into the substance of
the Legislation and found it violative of the "due process"
provisions of the Constitution. The case, however, involved
the validity of a statute creating a licensing board, a field
where the Court has indicated that it considers that the civil
rights of the free citizens of North Carolina, particularly
the right to engage in one of the ordinary trades or occupations, are being unwarrantedly attacked. Outside the
licensing field, the Court has shown, by its holdings and by
the language of its opinions, that it is following the Supreme
N.C.G.S. 113-172.
Bupra, note 16.
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Court of the United States in shifting the emphasis on "due
process of law" in the economic field from inquiry into the
substance of legislation to inquiry into the question of
whether the legislation under scrutiny by the judiciary
satisfies procedural "due process" requirements. The North
Carolina cases show that the North Carolina Supreme Court,
like many other state courts, 27 while willing to give great
deference to legislative opinion in economic matters, is not
willing to completely strip itself of the power to use the
"due process" clauses of the State Constitution to invalidate
economic legislation for defects of substance. Whether the
Court will continue its present course of deferring to the
views of the legislature in economic matters in general,
while closely scrutinizing the substance of economic legislation in the licensing field, is purely a matter of conjecture.
It i, submitted that the Court is not without justification
in its seeminglt anomalous position, in view of the extent
to which licensing boards may be used to create monopolies
or closed "guilds" in the most ordinary fields of human
endeavor. The Court may find support for its present position not only in the North Carolina Constitution 28 which
specifically expresses an abhorrence of perpetuities and
monopolies, but also in the position taken by some of the
more liberal members of the United States Supreme Court
in cases involving the validity of licensing statutes. Mr.
Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Reed, and the late Justices
29
Murphy and Rutledge have dissented in recent cases upholding state exclusionary licensing statutes. While these
dissents were based on grounds of violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution rather
than the Due Process Clauses, they indicate a hostility of
even the most liberal justices to state legislative action
creating monopolies in the ordinary human occupations.
If the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution
is strong enough to support an argument against exclusionary licensing, Article 1, sec. 31 of the North Carolina ConSee note 2.

N. C. Constitution Art. 1-31.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), and Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Com'rs of New Orleans, 330 U. S. 552 (1947).
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stitution declaring monopolies against the genius of a free
state. seemsstrong enough to support-the North Carolina

Court in invalidating licensing measures which tend to
create monopolies in such innocuous. fields as dry cleaning
and photography.
ARNOLD MCKINNON.

